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1 Introduction
In a smooth pure exchange economy with fixed total resources, suppose that en-
dowments are redistributed across agents according to a redistribution policy. De-
fine such a policy by a continuous map γ : [0, 1] → Ω(r), γ(0) = ω0, γ(1) = ω1,
where Ω(r) denotes the set of endowments with fixed total resources r ∈ Rl and x
(y) denotes the initial (final) allocation, respectively. If we write, using standard
vector notation to denote the aggregate excess demand function, the equilibrium
condition as z(p(t), γ(t)) = 0, t ∈ [0, 1], very natural questions are whether p(t) is
locally unique and it is changing continuously while the parameter ω is varying.
As highlighted by [6, p. 315], an affirmative answer to these two questions is cru-
cial for comparative statics analysis and planning theory (the advantage of using a
continuous policy would be invalidated by discontinuities of prices). In particular,
the use of the second welfare theorem becomes problematic with multiplicity and
instability of prices (see [5] and references therein).
In order to provide an answer to these questions, the traditional approach uses
the implicit function theorem (IFT). Since IFT holds locally, this approach cannot
deal with arbitrary variations of regular endowments. Moreover, IFT depends on
a regularity condition, the non-singularity of the Jacobian matrix: it cannot be
applied if the endowments changed are singular economies. Summarizing: Multi-
plicity of prices and catastrophes may originate indeterminacy and ambiguity. In
Kehoe’s words [6, p. 333]: “it does not seem that any sort of comparative statics
methodology is applicable in such circumstances”.
A geometric understanding of the relationship between endowments and price
variations can be provided by the equilibrium manifold approach [2]. If we denote
by S the set of normalized prices, the equilibrium manifold E(r) ⊂ S × Ω(r)
is the set of prices and endowments such that aggregate excess demand is zero.
Let us denote by pi : E(r) → Ω(r) the natural projection, i.e. the restriction to
the equilibrium manifold E(r) of the projection (p, ω) 7→ ω from S × Ω(r) into
Ω(r) (see [2] and Section 3). The structure of the equilibrium manifold and the
properness property of the natural projection (see Section 3) entail the existence
of smooth selections of equilibrium prices: i.e., an infinitesimal change of regular
endowments implies an infinitesimal change of the corresponding equilibrium price
vectors. It is worth noting that this smooth selection property (SSP) is not a
theory of equilibrium selection (for the existence of a continuous random selection
see [9, p. 348] and [10]). As Balasko points out [2, p. 94], this structural stability
property “should not be confused with stability in the sense of tatonnement”.
When endowments are redistributed according to γ(t), SSP holds when γ(t)
is a local and regular policy. By local we mean that γ(t) belongs to a sufficiently
small neighborhood Ux of the initial economy x = γ(0) and by regular we mean
that γ(t) does not cross singular economies (see [2] or Section 3). In fact if a
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continuous local policy γ(t) should cross the set of singular economies, it could
give rise to catastrophes (see [1, 4]), thus determining discontinuities of prices.
In this paper we are interested in whether non local or regular redistributions
of endowments across consumers can be supported by continuous price changes.
This question is deeply related (see Remark 4.2) to the issue, raised and tackled
by Balasko, of finding the largest domain of definition of the smooth selection
mappings (see [2, p. 94 and 190]). In the case of two goods and an arbitrary
number of consumers or in the case of two consumers and an arbitrary number of
goods, he shows that the largest definition sets for the equilibrium price selections
coincide with the connected component of the set of regular equilibria. When the
number of consumers and goods are arbitrary, Balasko shows [2, Theorem 7.3.10]
that the selection is defined if one takes as domain of definition the connected
component of an open and dense subset of the space of economies Ω(r).
The main difference between our work and Balasko’s issue is that we are not
looking for the largest domain of definition but we are concerned with a path
representing a redistribution of endowments. In this case one can extend the
domain of definition of the selection, restricted to this path, to the connected
component of the set of regular equilibria (see Theorem 4.1 when the redistribution
only involves regular endowments).
This result can be proven by using the arc lifting property (ALP), a property
known in the mathematics of covering spaces (see Proposition 2.1). Let us denote
with γ˜(t) = (p(t), γ(t)) a continuous path on the equilibrium manifold. ALP
says, roughly speaking, that if we start from an initial equilibrium (p, ω′) and we
reallocate endowments to ω′′ through a redistribution policy γ(t), where γ(0) = ω′
and γ(1) = ω′′, then there exists a (unique) equilibrium path γ˜(t) ∈ E(r) such
that pi(γ˜(t)) = γ(t) (where the endpoints of γ(t) belong to the same connected
component of Ω(r)). Therefore ALP extends to the connected component what
only holds locally by SSP, overcoming the local condition imposed by IFT and
providing theoretical foundations to the assumption that when regular endowments
are changed smoothly, the corresponding equilibrium price vectors will also change
smoothly.
When the policy is not regular, i.e., when the redistribution concerns singular
economies, the existence of a lift on E(r) of a continuous policy becomes an issue.
By using the geometric construction by [7, 8], in Theorem 4.3 we show under
what conditions it is still possible to get a continuous path of equilibrium price
vectors p(t) while we change endowments according to a policy which encounters
catastrophes. The intuition is that, in order to obtain the desired result, one needs
to construct a path transversal to the set of critical equilibria and to project it onto
the space of endowments. In [7] the authors define the length between two regular
equilibria as the number of intersection points of the path connecting them with
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the set of critical equilibria and show the existence of a minimal path according
to this definition of distance. In [8] it is shown that there exists a Riemannian
metric on the equilibrium manifold E(r) such that a minimal geodesic connecting
two (sufficiently close) regular equilibria intersects the set of critical equilibria in a
finite number of points. This metric can be regarded as an algorithm to calculate
the optimal path γ˜ : [0, 1] → E(r) connecting two regular equilibria. Under this
perspective, Theorems 4.1 and 4.3 can provide foundations to apply the tools
developed by [7, 8] to construct an optimal policy.
The structure of this paper is the following. Sections 2 and 3 recall some
mathematical results and the economic model. Section 4 is devoted to the proof
of our main results.
2 Mathematical preliminaries
We start this section by introducing some mathematical results on covering spaces
and lifting properties. Unless otherwise specified all the topological spaces involved
are subsets of Euclidean spaces and all maps between them are assumed to be
smooth. We refer the reader to [11] for the standard material on coverings. Let X˜
and X be two (not necessarily connected) topological spaces. A map p : X˜ → X
is called a covering map if it satisfies the following conditions:
(a) p is surjective;
(b) each x ∈ X has an open neighbourhood U such that p−1(U) is a disjoint
union of open sets in X˜, each of which is mapped by p diffeomorphically
onto U .
The neighbourhood U is said to be well-covered for p and the cardinality of
the fiber of x, i.e. the set p−1(x), is called the number of sheets of the covering.
Observe that this number could be infinite as for the map p : R → S1 from the
real numbers to the unit circle S1 ⊂ R2 defined by p(t) = (cos t, sin t).
Property (b) immediatly implies that p is a local diffeomorhism and hence an
open map. Therefore a injective covering map is a diffeomorphism. We point out
that there exist surjective local diffeomorphisms which are not a covering map. For
example if one restricted the map of the previous example to the interval (0, 4pi),
one would obtain a surjective local diffeomorphism but the point (1, 0) does not
admit a well-covered neighbourhood.
Let p : X˜ → X be any (smooth) map and let Y be a connected topological space.
A lift of a map f : Y → X is a map f˜ : Y → X˜ such that pf˜ = f . In the following
propositions we state some standard properties of covering spaces which play a
crucial role in the present paper. We recall that an arc on X is a map α : I → X,
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where I = [0, 1]. The points α(0) and α(1) are called the starting and final points
of α.
Proposition 2.1 (ALP: arc lifting property) Given a covering space p : X˜ →
X, let α : I → X be an arc with starting point x0 and let x˜0 be any point in the
fiber of x0. There exists a unique lift α˜ : I → X˜ of α with starting point x˜0.
In the previous proposition the existence of a lift relies on properties of a
covering maps. Once a lift is given its uniqueness depends only on the fact that p
is a local diffeomorphism. We state this observation in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2 Let p : X˜ → X be a local diffeomorphism, Y a connected topo-
logical space, y0 ∈ Y , x˜0 ∈ X˜ and f : Y → X a map such that f(y0) = x0 = p(x˜0).
A lift f˜ : Y → X˜ of f such that f˜(y0) = x˜0 is unique.
A natural question is to understand when a surjective local diffeomorphism is
a covering map. One can prove that a local diffeomorphism p : X˜ → X such that
every arc on X can be lifted is in fact a covering map. Since this property is gen-
erally impossible to handle, one can impose some sufficient topological conditions
in order to have a covering map as in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3 Let p : X˜ → X be a proper surjective local diffeomorphism.
Then p is a finite covering map.
Recall that a continuous map p : X˜ → X is proper if the preimage of any
compact set of X is a compact set of X˜.
3 The model
We refer the reader to [2] for the economic set-up briefly described in this section.
We consider a pure exchange economy with fixed total resources. Let m and l
be, respectively, the (finite) number of agents and commodities. Let S = {p ∈
Rl | pi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , l − 1, pl = 1} be the set of prices normalized by the
numeraire convention. Let r ∈ Rl be the vector of fixed total resources and denote
by Ω(r) the set of initial endowments with fixed total resources, i.e., Ω(r) = {ω ∈
Rlm|∑mi=1 ωi = r}. Under the standard smooth assumptions on preferences (see
[2, Ch. 2]), the problem of maximizing the smooth utility function ui : Rl → R
subject to the budget constraint p ·ωi = wi gives the unique solution fi(p, wi), i.e.
consumer i’s demand. Define the equilibrium manifold, denoted by E(r), the set
of pairs of prices and endowments such that aggregate net demand is zero, i.e.,
E(r) = {(p, ω) ∈ S × Ω(r) |
m∑
i=1
fi(p, p · ωi) = r}.
5
The set E(r) is globally diffeomorphic to Rl(m−1) (see [2, Ch. 5]). Let pi :
E(r)→ Ω(r) be the natural projection, i.e. the restriction to E(r) of the projection
S × Ω(r) → Ω(r), such that (p, ω) 7→ ω. The map pi is smooth, proper and
surjective.
One can define the set of critical equilibria, denoted by Ec(r), as the pairs
(p, ω) ∈ E(r) such that the derivative of pi is not onto [1]. The set Ec(r) is a
closed subset of measure zero of the equilibrium manifold E(r) (see [3]). The set
of singular economies, denoted by Σ, is the image via pi of the set Ec(r). The
set Σ is a closed (by properness of pi) and a measure zero set in Ω(r) (by Sard’s
theorem). Let us define the regular economies R = Ω(r) \ Σ as the regular values
of the map pi.
We state as a theorem the following important result due to Balasko.
Theorem 3.1 (Balasko [2]) The map pi|pi−1(R) : pi
−1(R)→ R is a finite covering.
Proof: By the inverse function theorem pi|pi−1(R) is a local diffeomorphism. Since
pi|pi−1(S) : pi
−1(S) → S is still proper and surjective for any subset S ⊂ Ω(r), the
result follows by Proposition 2.3. 
The economic meaning of this property, known as smooth selection property (SSP)
[2, p. 94], is that in a neighborhood of a regular economy, smooth changes of the
parameter ω imply smooth changes of the corresponding equilibrium price vectors,
namely there exists a supporting equilibrium price vector sufficiently close to the
initial one. As highlighted in the Introduction, SSP is not a theory of equilibrium
selection: i.e., if endowments are locally redistributed smoothly across consumers
then the selected equilibrium price vector will change smoothly.
4 Main results
In the sequel we denote a redistribution policy of endowments as a continuous
map γ : [0, 1] → Ω(r), where ω0 = γ(0) and ω1 = γ(1). Since we are inter-
ested in whether arbitrary redistributions of endowments across consumers can be
supported by continuous price changes, we define a redistribution policy γ(t):
• regular if γ(t) ⊂ R;
• singular if γ(t) ∈ Σ for some t ∈ [0, 1].
A first very natural question is to investigate whether SSP holds when the
policy is regular. The following theorem provides an affirmative answer.
6
Theorem 4.1 Let γ : I → R be a regular policy connecting ω0 = γ(0) and ω1 =
γ(1) and let p0 be the supporting equilibrium price vector associated with ω0. Then
there exists a unique lift γ˜ : I → pi−1(R) of γ.
Proof: It follows by Proposition 2.1 and Theorem 3.1. 
Remark 4.2 If there are two commodities or two consumers the theorem is triv-
ial since Balasko has shown [2, p. 191] that the largest domain of definition of
selections of price equilibria coincide with the connected component of the set of
regular equilibria. In the general case, it is shown [2, Theorem 7.3.10] that one
can take as domain of definition the connected component of an open and dense
subset of the space of economies. It is in this general case where Theorem 4.1
applies, by providing a further insight of the structural stability of the equilibrium
manifold. In fact it shows that the domain of definition, if restricted to a policy,
can be extended to the connected component of the set of regular equilibria.
When the policy is singular the main issue becomes the existence of a lift.
Therefore we tackle the problem using a different strategy. We construct a minimal
path on E(r) which connects two regular equilibria (p, ω) and (p′, ω′) and which
intersects Ec(r) on a finite number of points. The existence of such a path has
been shown by [7], where the (minimal) path represents a solution to the problem
of minimizing the number of intersection points with the set of critical equilibria,
and by [8], where the path is a minimal geodesic according to a Riemannian metric
constructed on E(r). The policy is found by projecting this path onto the space of
endowments Ω(r). Theorem 4.3 shows under what conditions this policy admits
a (unique) lift. In the theorem we consider minimal paths as in [7], but the
construction holds for any path transversal to Ec(r) and so even for geodesics as
in [8].
Theorem 4.3 Let γ˜ : I → E(r) be a minimal arc connecting two reqular equilibria
x and y, where x, y ∈ pi−1(R). Then γ˜ is uniquely determined by its projection
γ = pi(γ˜) and by a finite number of its points.
Proof: Let C = Ec(r) ∩ γ˜(I). Since γ˜ is a minimal path either C = ∅ or C is
a finite number of points. If C = ∅ then the conclusion follows by Proposition
2.2 applied to the local diffeomorphism pi : E \ Ec(r) → pi(E \ Ec(r)). If C is
nonempty set C = {c1, c2, . . . , ck}. Then there exist 0 < t1 ≤ . . . ≤ tk < 1
such that ci = γ˜(ti), i = 1, . . . , k. Choose ξi = γ˜(si), with i = 1, . . . , k − 1,
with tj < sj < tj+1, j = 1, . . . , k − 1 such that γ˜(sj) ∈ E \ Ec(r). Consider
the following subarcs of γ˜: γ˜c1x , γ˜
ξ1
c1
, γ˜c2ξ1 , . . . , γ˜
ck
ξk−1 , γ˜
y
ck
connecting x with c1, c1 with
ξ1,. . . , ξk−1 with ck, and ck with y. By applying again Proposition 2.2 to the local
diffeomorphism pi : E\Ec(r)→ pi(E\Ec(r)) it follows that γ˜c1x \{c1}, γ˜ξ1c1 \{c1}, γ˜c2ξ1 \
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{c2}, . . . , γ˜ckξk−1 \ {ck}, γ˜yck \ {ck} are the unique lifts of pi(γ˜c1x ) \ {pi(c1)}, pi(γ˜ξ1c1 ) \
{pi(c1)}, pi(γ˜c2ξ1 )\{pi(c2)}, . . . , pi(γ˜ckpi(ξk−1))\{pi(ck)}, pi(γ˜
pi(y)
pi(ck
)\{pi(ck)} passing through
the points {ξ1, . . . , ξk−1}, respectively. Then, by a continuity argument, γ˜ is the
unique lift of γ = pi(γ˜) passing through the finite set of points C ∪ {ξ1, . . . , ξk−1}.

Some features that characterize our geometric construction deserve a few com-
ments. First, Theorem 4.1 should not be regarded as a particular case of Theorem
4.3, when C = ∅. In Theorem 4.1 the redistribution policy is regular, i.e. γ(t) ⊂ R,
while in Theorem 4.3 it is not. Moreover it can be singular even at points which are
the projections of regular equilibria belonging to γ˜(t). Second, under additional
assumptions on the equilibrium price dynamics , this construction can potentially
be extended to construct an algorithm to find an optimal redistribution policy.
Roughly speaking, the idea is the following. Given an initial and final economy ω
and ω′, the social planner wants to redistribute endowments across consumers to
move the economy toward the target ω′. He/she constructs a Riemannian metric
which embodies the objectives of the redistribution policy and he (she) then finds a
geodesic γ˜(t) joining x = (p, ω) and y = (p′, ω′). The redistribution policy is then
pi(γ˜(t)) = γ(t), which represents the optimal choice among the infinite policies
joining ω and ω′ Observe that this policy, which is optimal from the perspective
of the equilibrium manifold, can appear quite counterintuitive in the space of the
endowments (for example, its self-intersections can be omeomorphic to intervals).
Finally, when dealing with singularities it is necessary to fix as many supporting
price vectors as many connected components crossed by the path on E(r). This
is due to the potential discontinuity which may arise when γ(t) crosses singular
economies. A minimal path allows to minimize the number of supporting price
vectors to be fixed.
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